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Abstract
Security has played a major role in cognitive radio networks. Numerous researches have mainly focused on attacking
detection based on source localization and detection probability. However, few of them took the penalty of attackers
into consideration and neglected how to implement effective punitive measures against attackers. To address this
issue, this article proposes a novel penalty mechanism based on cognitive trust value. The main feature of this
mechanism has been realized by six functions: authentication, interactive, configuration, trust value collection, storage
and update, and punishment. Data fusion center (FC) and cluster heads (CHs) have been put forward as a hierarchical
architecture to manage trust value of cognitive users. Misbehaving users would be punished by FC by declining their
trust value; thus, guaranteeing network security via distinguishing attack users is of great necessity. Simulation results
verify the rationality and effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.
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1 Introduction
Wireless communication technology is in a period of
rapid development, and growing business demand has
driven communication technology renewal and develop-
ment. In the process of development, the growing busi-
ness demands are restricted by the limited spectrum
resource. The report of Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) suggests that currently spectrum scarcity
is largely due to the inefficient and rigid regulations rather
than the physical shortage of the spectrum [1]. Recently,
cognitive radio network (CRN) has been brought to the
forefront due to its potential to solve the conflict between
limited spectrum supply and spectrum demand from
ever-increasing wireless applications and services, which
is defined as a wireless network employing technology
to obtain knowledge of its operational and geograph-
ical environment, established policies, and its internal
state; to dynamically and autonomously adjust its opera-
tional parameters and protocols according to its obtained
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knowledge in order to achieve end-to-end network objec-
tives; and to learn from the results obtained [2].
However, CRNs are an open and random access net-
work environment, where the unlicensed secondary users
(SUs) can use the channels that are not currently used
by the licensed primary users (PUs) by spectrum-sensing
technology. Therefore, they not only face all the secu-
rity threats in the traditional wireless networks, but also
new security threats that have arisen due to their unique
cognitive characteristics, such as [3] the following:
Primary user emulation attacks (PUEA) In this type of
attacks, attackers may transmit at forbidden time slots and
effectively emulate the primary user to make the protocol-
compliant SUs erroneous conclusion that the primary
user is present.
Spectrum sensing data falsification attacks (SSDF)
Attackers send false observation information, intention-
ally or unintentionally, to the fusion center (FC), and let
the FC make the wrong decision.
PUEA and SSDF attacks focus on the physical layer of
a CRN. Furthermore, these could also make MAC layer
threats-vulnerabilities and IEEE 802.22 specific threats,
cross-layer attack that adversaries can launch attacks tar-
geting multiple layers, software-defined radio security
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that falls into two main categories: software-based pro-
tection, and hardware-based protection, and other tradi-
tional security threats.
Security issues in CRNs become unavoidable challenge,
and how to solve the security problems has become a
research hot-spot. In [4], Fragkiadakis et al. had given a
comprehensive survey of the existing works on CRN secu-
rity, which introduced some security threats and detection
techniques in detail. Most of the studies in security of
CRN focus on spectrum sensing techniques, where the
main contributions are attack defense based on attack
detection. The existing achievement discussing detailed
approaches for the detection and mitigation of specific
attacks, such as by Subbalakshmi et al. in [5-8] and other
scholars, Chen et al. in [3,9], Zhu et al. in [10], Yu et al.
in [11], Wu et al. in [12,13]. They all have made a great
contribution in the CRN security areas, and their achieve-
ments will not be described here, as it is out of the scope
of this paper.
Current researches are mostly focusing on signal detec-
tion based on attack defense but could not implement any
punishment. A likely instance is that we cannot punish an
offender, even though the person transgresses moral or
civil law; the only thing we can do is offering the proof to
legal operation department. We will analyze the existing
security mechanisms before our proposed one.
Ding et al. in [14] provided a novel effective algo-
rithm using kernel KMC (k-means clustering) method
to be answerable for attacker detection, which not only
improves the attacker detection performance but also
offers processing and memory savings. Zhang et al. in
[15] proposed a security scheme based on localized com-
binatorial keying (LOCK) scheme and employees ID-
based secure group key management, which minimizes
the number of key storage requirement and the num-
ber of the communication messages for rekeying. Sakran
et al. in [16] proposed a secure relay selection scheme
which selects a trusted decode and forward relay to assist
the SUs and maximize the achievable secrecy rate that is
subjected to the interference power constraints at the PUs
for the different number of eavesdroppers and PUs under
available channel knowledge in the security constrained
CRNs. In [17], Chen et al. proposed a game theoretical
anti-jamming scheme andmodeled the jamming and anti-
jamming process as a Markov decision process. With this
approach, secondary users are able to avoid the jamming
attack launched by external attackers. In [18], Jo et al.
proposed a selfish attack detection technique, COOPON
(called cooperative neighboring cognitive radio nodes).
However, this approach needs to detect and decide the
secondary users as legitimate SU (LSU) or selfish SU
(SSU) through comparing the reported data one by one
while selecting a reliable user as the comparison object.
In this case, it is bound to bring a large consumption
of calculation when lots of secondary users are in this
scheme. In order to improve the cooperative detection
performance, Ding et al. in [19] designed a joint spatio-
temporal spectrum sensing algorithm, which based on
three phases (i.e., a global cooperation phase, a local coop-
eration phase, and a joint decision phase). Gao et al. in [20]
proposed a privacy preserving framework in collaborative
spectrum sensing to prevent location privacy leaking from
the collaborative attacks. This scheme based on encrypt-
ing authentication of fusion center can effectively thwart
PUEA, SSDF attack, and misbehavior. Pietro et al. in [21]
proposed an anti-jamming technology based on time-
delayed broadcast scheme, which opens up a new area for
cognitive radio network security. This mechanism takes
the greedy malicious users into account which are mainly
improving the access opportunities through misconduct.
However, the security schemes described above are still
passive attack defense. How to take an active defense and
impose the penalty for attack users are the main consider-
ation of this article. In [22,23], the distributed trust models
were proposed individually based on parameter model-
ing and time-window feedback mechanism, which have
the advantages in countering strategic altering behavior
and dishonest feedbacks of malicious users. The trust
mechanism that based on authentication can effectively
guarantee the reliability of the network. Moreover, the
punishment mechanism ensures the security of networks
by constrainingmisbehaving users effectively. So, the trust
scheme and penalty scheme are two important aspects of
the active defense technologies.
In this paper, a novel trust mechanism SecurityManage-
ment based on Trust Determination (SMTD) is proposed
for solving the security issue in CRNs. A centralized man-
agement in FC [24,25] is needed to manage access of
cognitive users effectively, and FC has absolute author-
ity of cognitive user authentication management and can
carry out effective punishment for the attackers, while
attacks are unable to avoid only through signal detect-
ing. Therefore, we put forward the mechanism to include
the following modules: authentication, interactive, con-
figuration, the trust value collection, the trust store and
update, and punish, etc. In order to reduce the compu-
tational load brought by cognitive interaction between
users, we put forward the two-layer network hierarchi-
cal architecture including fusion center and cluster heads
(FC+CHs). FC is mainly responsible for the trust value
of store/update, cognitive users access network authen-
tication for the first time, distribution of cognitive user
cluster network, resource allocation, and the most impor-
tant function, to execute punishment of attack users;
CHs interact with the cognitive users in sub-networks
then update and report trust values to the fusion center.
Details of the metric used in this paper can be seen from
(Table 1).
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Table 1 List of parameters
Symbol Description
Ci Cluster indicia
S The cluster set
Vij Trust value
Ri Resource
λi Resource allocation threshold
V The matrix of trust value
a, b, c, d The weight coefficient of attribute
s The rate of decay
α,β , γ The weight coefficient of trust value
Rf Covering radius of FC
ρr The threshold of cluster head
L The maximum number of cluster heads
K
Maximum number of cognitive users
per cluster sub-network
N The number of cognitive users
σ The attenuation factor
ε The reward factor
σ The penalty factor
ξ The recovery factor
ζ The regulate factors
η Penalty accumulation factor
The main contributions of this paper are as following:
• Proposed a centralized trust scheme
• Two-layer hierarchical architecture
• Grade of penalty mechanism
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the cognitive scenario and our proposed trust
scheme. In Section 3, we introduce the function module
of the dual-layer architecture. Penalty scheme is intro-
duced in Section 4. Section 5 describes the process of
the overall mechanism in detail. In Section 6, we analyze
the order of complexity. Simulation and verification will
be done in Section 7. At last, we conclude our work in
Section 8.
2 Mechanismmodel
In this section, we will present the cognitive scenario of
the proposed mechanism and then introduce the process
of trust determination.
2.1 Application scenario
A centralized CRN scenario is illustrated as in Figure 1.
There are some cognitive networks coexisting with the
primary networks and each one has a central service FC.
A cognitive network is divided into some cluster sub-
networks that contain dozens of cognitive users. Every
cluster sub-network has one centralized cluster head
(CH) in charge of collecting all users’ cognitive infor-
mation in the sub-network and then reporting to the
FC. The detailed functions of the FC and CH are as
follows:
Fusion center: collecting available radio resources of pri-
mary users through cognitive users sensing reports and
conduct resource management for the cognitive users;
calculating trust values of all cognitive users in a cog-
nitive network and storing them; implementing punish-
ment for misbehaving users, and updating trust value
results
Cluster heads: collecting trust values of cognitive users
and reporting to FC by interaction; reporting misbehaving
users’ information to FC timely while an attack is detected
2.2 Trust criterion
Trust determination is a total evaluation for an user’s
capacity and reputation. These evaluation results are from
other entities via information interplay and can be used
to guide the user’s further action. Reputation is an obser-
vation according to other entities or a summation of the
entity’s previous action. Attributes of trust determination
can be shown as follows:
Attack-resistant: Trust determination should recognize
and resist attacks, such as forger (PUEA), dishonest feed-
back (SSDF attack), slander, and united fraud.
Availability: Trust is constituted by constant learning
and sufficient experience. As the time goes on, trust value
gradually drops down.
Rewards and punishment: Trust determination should
provide a suitable reward scheme which can serve well-
performing users better with priority access or bandwidth.
Punishment scheme aims to decrease the user’s trust value
in terms of an occurring attack.
Authentication mechanism: For a new accessing user, FC
will allocate an identity authentication which consists of
user identity, time, initial value, available channel (avail-
able resources list), resource utilization limits, service
capacity, and so on.
Sensitivity: Sensitivity which reflects the degree of trust
is affected by the changing network environment. Specif-
ically, cognitive users could be on-line or off-line at any
time, thus, a breakdown and trust model should recognize
and adjust trust in accordance with various needs.
Distinction: For a cognitive user trusted enough, a sud-
den fraud would bring serious communication disorder.
Other than that, malicious cognitive users might oscillate
between establishing trust and defrauding trust. To avoid
such deceit effectively, the model is expected to offer a
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Figure 1 Scenario of proposedmechanism.
mechanism to identify the changes of users’ trust value
efficiently.
2.3 Trust determination model
Aside from all the attributes mentioned above, an
ideal trust model should also have a trust manage-
ment process which involves the generation of trust,
presentation, measurement, interplay, punishment, and
updating.
2.3.1 Generation of trust degree
Trust among cognitive users erects on demand by
resource sharing and communication, which has been
proven to be an efficient mechanism. Trust is a subject
behavior which is centralized by FC and gives each access-
ing cognitive user an authentication header, as shown in
Table 2.





vij The initial trust value
R1, R2, · · · Rn Resource list
λ1, λ2, · · · λn Resource access threshold
SC Service capacity
2.3.1.1 User identity
Referring to human society [22], user identities can be
presented as follows:
Identity = h(Key)||SigX(SK (ID)) (1)
where h(·) is hash function, Key means the key word for
entity service, SigX(·) is digital signature, X is the private
key, ID is entity identity, SK is scrambling algorithm,
K is scrambling key, and || is a binding symbol which
makes the correspondence between marking identity and
true identity. A signature can achieve certification while
scrambling can ensure the anonymity of entity. As regard
to legal authentication in distributed anonymous condi-
tion, it can be achieved in the way of zero-knowledge [26].
Details will be ignored in terms of the article length limit.
2.3.1.2 Time
This metric indicates the time when cognitive user gets
access to a network. It can also be used as a start point for
user interaction and time decaying.
2.3.1.3 Cluster
This metric represents the serial number of cluster. If it
is not the first time for cognitive user to access cluster, Ci
would remain a previous value. Otherwise, Ci would be
set as 0.
2.3.1.4 Initial value of trust
When a cognitive user gets access to a network, a trust
value vij would be given which is usually half less than the
Li et al. EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 2014, 2014:48 Page 5 of 16
http://asp.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/48
maximum. A high value of trust may bring baleful attack,
while a low value of trust may make some users idle.
2.3.1.5 Resources list
There is more than one available resource when cogni-
tive user gets access to network. R1,R2, . . .Rn are used to
present the available channels.
2.3.1.6 Threshold of resource access
Thresholds of resource access are corresponding to
resources lists and are presented by λ1, λ2, . . . λn. Access
permissions are set depending on these threshold. For
example, if λn = 1, the access requests from users whose
trust value is between 0 and 1 would be rejected.
2.3.1.7 Service capacity
It means the QoS guarantee for single cognitive user.
Cognitive users should mark their service capacity, such
as bandwidth and channels.
2.3.2 The characterization of trust
Trust is subjective, reflecting interests and demands of
cognitive users. Different context and interests corre-
spond to different value of trust. This article shall illustrate
trust based on a three-layer structure, namely
Tr = U · S · A. (2)
U present cognitive users that can be classified into hon-
est secondary users and malicious secondary users. S is
the cover region of CRN, for example, in black, gray, and
white three-region scenarios [27]. To simplify the analysis,
we selected a single scenario.A is the attributemade by FC
in certain context and can be classed into four groups: ser-
vice quality SQ, interaction quantity TQ, processing time
PT, and cost and others CM. Different users calculate the
interactive trust value by adjusting attribute weight vector,
as follows:
V = a · SQ + b · TQ + c · PT + d · CM (3)
where a, b, c, d is the attribute weight satisfying a + b +
c + d = 1. As FC’s assessment of attribute is fuzzy, trust
should be quantified according to users’ behavior in the
network, e.g., Vlevel ∈ {−2, 1, 0, 1, 2}, respectively, corre-
sponding to five levels, namely, extremely distrusted, little
trusted, general trust, considerably trust, and extremely
trusted.
2.3.3 Trust metrics
The basic metrics related to trust of SUs are considered as
follows:




A(s, tl) · Attrih · DSlih (4)
where l is the frequency of interactions, and DSih is
the satisfaction evaluation of SUh to SUi, which
contains four attribute evaluations
DSih = {SQ,TQ,PT,CM}.
The bigger the value of DSih, the higher is the
reliability of SUi; Attrih = [ a b c d ] is the weight
coefficient matrix of DSih; A(s, tl) is attenuation
function defined as
A(s, tl) = v · e−s·L(tl) (5)
where S is the decay rate and meets the condition
0 < s ≤ 1; L(tl) is interactive function on time,
L(tl) = Round((tl − t0)/T), and T is scanning period
that can be set according to different needs (e.g.,
days, hours, minutes, etc.).
The degree of satisfaction DSlih is the value that
derived from interaction between SUi and SUh in l
times.
2. The indirect trust value The indirect trust value is
similar to the direct ones, but the objects of
interaction are not cluster heads, but the otherm − 2
SUs in the same cluster sub-network.





A(s, tl) · Attrik · DSlik
(6)
3. The historical trust value HistTri is determined by
the final trust value of target user that accessed the
cognitive network last time.
4. The reward value The reward value is used to
encourage the honest users, and it is relevant to
Dev(t), Acti(t) and A(s, t).
Rew(t) = ε · G(Acti(t) · A(s, t)Dev(t) ) (7)
where G(·) is normalized function, ε presents the
rewarded factor that restricts the value rang of the
reward.
Based on the analysis above, we can define the user-related
trust metric as follows:
User evaluation difference of trust It is defined to mea-
sure SUs trust value transformation in a period of time.
Dev(t) = Var(Tri(t)) (8)
where Tri(t) is the trust value of target user SUi in t time
slot.
Reliability evaluation of trust The reciprocal of trust
evaluation deviation from other users to the target user is
expressed as
Rel(t) = 1Var(Trij) (9)
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where Trij is the interaction trust value between the target
user SUi and cognitive user SUj. The smaller the variance
is, the higher the reliability of user trust is.









which reflects the interaction degree of target user com-
pared with other users in the same sub-network.
Trust value attenuation The degree of trust value atten-
uation with time is defined as
A(s, t) = σ · round(10 · v · e−st) (11)
where σ is the attenuation factor, v is the initial trust
value, t is scanning period, s is the rate of attenuation and
round(·) denotes the minimum integer large than ·.
2.3.4 Information interaction
Interaction relates to the trust value evaluation among
cognitive users in the communication process to update
the trust value. Interaction occurs between CHs and SUs
and CHs and FC.
The evaluation trust value from user SUi to user SUj is
Trij =α · DirTrij + β · IndTrij
+ γ · HistTri + Rew (12)
where α, β , and γ are the normalized weight factor, corre-
sponding to direct trust DirTrij, indirect trust IndTrij and
historical trust HistTri value satisfying α+β+γ = 1. Rew
is the value of reward feedback.
The trust value will be reported to FC by CHs after
information interaction. FC owns the rights to control
SUs’ access and resource allocation depending on the
status of trust.
There will be a trust value lists matrix V, stored in the
fusion center after FC gets the whole trust value of SUs
in CWNs. Afterwards, FC provides service to SUs whose
trust value exceeds than the access threshold (vij ≥ λi).
2.3.5 Rewards and penalties
Rewards and penalties are for trustable and malicious
users, and the scheme is performed by FC. We define
reward’s form as (7).
The coefficient is predefined as ε = 0.1 through the test.
Considering the scope of value span, the reward value is
limited below 0.5.
Penalty for misbehaving users refers to adjust the
trust value. When an attack user or misbehaving user is
detected by FC via the trust value analysis, the cognitive
user’s trust value is reduced so that the user is constrained
to access the cognitive networks. The detailed illustration
will be presented in Section 4.
2.3.6 Update
There are two update forms of trust value stored in FC:
• CHs report the updated trust value of cognitive users
in its related sub-network to FC in period Treport.
• FC polls all cognitive users including the cluster
heads periodically in Tpolling.
In addition to the above trust value to update through
the interactivemode, the trust value of SUs has the charac-
teristics of self-damping and self-restoring. For example,
the trust value is approaching to 0 with the time increas-
ing regardless of the value greater than 0 or not in the case
of no reward feedback.
3 Analysis of two-layer hierarchical architecture
Considering the scalability of the uploading process of all
cognitive users, for the sake of decreasing the complexity
and enhancing the management reliability, we take a two-
level uploading scheme via introducing the cluster head.
A cluster head is an advanced cognitive user who man-
ages a certain number of cognitive users, which possesses
the functions as manager of its sub-network cognitive
users’ trust value and reporting to FC. With the cluster
head’s assistance, cognitive users can be split into groups
and interact with FC in a centralized manner, which
brings high management efficiency. In this section, we use
the particle swarm algorithm to select the cluster head
from general cognitive users. Then the detailed interac-
tion processes between the cluster head and cognitive
users as well as the cluster head and the FC are designed,
which guarantees the trust value update of the cognitive
users.
3.1 Cluster head selection
In our scheme, the head has high-priority rights to utilize
the spectrum.We choose the K cluster heads based on the
following three principles [28]:
• The heads must have the highest trust value to fuse
the transmitted information. We select the prior SUs
according to the reliability.
• The heads are not so far away from the FC as the
propagation loss will be larger with the distance
expanding.
• The distance between two cluster heads should
exceed a specific value.
Based on the three principles above, we apply the parti-
cle swarm algorithm to conduct the cluster head selection
process. A detailed algorithm implementation flow is pre-
sented as follows:
Step 1 Initialize all the cognitive trust value memorizer
and setting FC coverage radius Rf , the selected cluster
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head threshold ρf , and the allowed maximum number of
cluster heads L.
Step 2 Cognitive users report their location (r, θ) and
trust value v to FC.
Step 3 FC picks up the users whose trust value are larger
than the threshold and records the total number as N.
Step 4 If N > L, FC should conduct extra selection
criteria as follows:
• Cluster heads should be near the FC.
• Any two selected cluster heads should be far with
each other enough.
Step 5 According to 4, L cognitive users are selected as
the cluster heads and the trust value are stored as matrix
V in the FC.
A proper CH selection algorithm makes a great differ-
ence to the network operation. A trustable and stable CH
can distinguish the malicious users in its sub-network and
perform relative punishment strategies. While an irre-
sponsible CH could leave the malicious users to perform
intrusion attack behavior and even malicious itself.
3.2 Trust value storage and interaction between FC and
CH
3.2.1 Trust value storage
In a CH sub-network, cognitive users interact with the
CH, thus producing a trust value for each user, judged
by CH. The trust value can be described as a vector as
Vi = [vi1 vi2 · · · vin], where i represents the ith CH and n
represents the total number of cognitive users inside the
sub-network. CH reports this trust sector to the FC which




v11 v22 · · · v1k1




vι1 vι2 · · · vιkt
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (13)
where l is the number of CHs in the network, and
ki (i = 1, 2, . . . , l) is the number of cognitive users inside
each CH sub-network. The trust value of call users can be
stored in the FC in two forms:
Form 1 The number of users in each CH is different.
The matrix V is a cell matrix: the number of elements in
each row is distinct. FC should reserve a dynamic space to
store the trust value matrix. This storage style could save
the storage space, on condition that extra users’ number
configuration overhead is needed. Because the storage is
simple, we set the trust value matrix row size as the same
κ = max{k1, k2, . . . , kt}. This forms a normal matrix by
supplementing zero in the element scarce position.
Form 2 The maximum number of users in each CH is
constrained by κ . A CH sub-network that contains users
more than κ should split into two sub-network. Storage
mode i.e., the matrix style, is the same as form 1.
3.2.2 The trust value interaction between FC and CHs
FC is in charge of the resource allocation to the sub-
network. A malicious user would be prone to the trust
evaluation of other normal cognitive users then causing
severe resource utilization problems. This kind of users
should be published by the FC by means of declining its
trust value or avoiding frequent interaction with other
users, for example. To implement the storage process, FC
should interact with the CHs for the cognitive users trust
value. We propose two approaches for the interaction
behavior:
Approach 1Cluster heads report the trust value vector to
FC and the value is updated in the FC side.
Approach 2 FC conducts polling to all the cognitive users
inside the network periodically and update the trust value
matrix. Discovering an abnormal user would trigger a
punishment implementing.
3.3 Interaction between CH and its associated cognitive
users
CH should interact with cognitive users to obtain the trust
value. For k users in a cluster sub-network, CH performs
trust value estimation for each user which forms a vector
as
TrCi = {Tri1, Tri2, . . . , Trtik}. (14)
Frequent interaction requires more power loss and cal-
culation source consumption of the CH users. Consid-
ering the trade-off between overhead and reward, CH
users are allowed to access the primary network pref-
erentially and obtain more spectrum bands. CH is not
responsible for the punishment implementing, which is
performed in FC, and CHs report the trust value status to
FC periodically.
4 Punishment
The FC can not only store the trust value of each user, but
also punish the illegal users in CRNs. In the criminal law,
the arbiter will implement different punishments accord-
ing to different criminal charges and give the criminals to
start with a clean slate opportunity. Modeled on the social
law, we proposed the punishment mechanism; the main
form of penalty concludes the reduced rate and recov-
ery degree of trust value, which represent the punishment
and release degree, respectively. In order to analyze the
punishment mechanismmore effectively, the attackers are
classified into three categories as follows:
Malicious users (MUs): This type of attackers sends false
observations in order to confuse other users or the FC,
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causing extensive DoS (denial of service) attacks mak-
ing a CRN hop from band to band, severely disrupting
its operation. Furthermore, adversaries could also cause
DoS attacks in PU networks by creating harmful inter-
ference, such as PUEA and SSDF. Malicious users are
harmful to the cognitive radio networks. Thus, the pun-
ishment should be harsh and the form is that MUs should
be punished quickly and released slowly.
Greedy users (GUs): These attackers continuously report
that a specific spectrum hole is occupied by incumbent
signals, which forces all other users to vacate the specific
band (spectrum hole) in order to acquire its exclusive use.
The goals of these attackers are to monopolize the spe-
cific band privately. Selfish attack is a typical example.
Because the greedy users are not devastating, the greedy
users should be both punished and released slowly.
Unintentionally misbehaving users (UMUs): This type of
users reports faulty observations for spectrum availability,
which is not from their subjective consciousness, but from
the malfunction of their software or hardware. Because of
unknown destructiveness, the unintentionally misbehav-
ing users should be punished quickly and be also released
quickly.
For different kinds of attackers, we punish them accord-
ing to diverse punishment model as illustrated in the
following:
Case 1:MUsThis kind of attackers are highly destructive,
e.g., PUEA and SSDF; thus, the punishment is the sever-
est for these attackers. Firstly, once the malicious users
are detected, the trust values of these users are reduced
to below 0 and then they are forbidden to access the net-
work in the next time slot. These users must increase their
trust values to access the network again. The punishment
function is defined as
Pena1(t) = −σ · e−ξ t + ζ (15)
where σ ∈ (0, 2) is the penalty factor whose value is deter-
mined according to the trust value, (which follows the
same rules in the following punishment model). ξ > 0 is
the recovery factor, whose value is bigger when the trust
value is bigger (which follows the same rules in the fol-
lowing punishment model). ζ is the regulate factor, which
restricts the trust value in a reasonable range.
Case 2: GUs When greedy users are detected, the pun-
ishment should be lighter, because they are less destruc-
tive than the malicious users. The trust value should be
decreased slowly and increased slowly too. This kind of
punishment function should be
Pena2(t) = −σ · e−ξ t2 + ζ (16)
Case 3: UMUs This kind of attack is not intentional,
and the trust value should be decreased quickly and be
recovered quickly. Once the user’s hardware is repaired,
the user can access the network simultaneously. Thus, the
punishment function should be
Pena3(t) = −σ ·[u(t) − u(t − Trep)]+ζ (17)
where u(·) is the step function, and Trep is the repair time.
Except for the punishment functions, there is a penalty
period Tpenalty that means the duration of punishment.
For the unmeant attacking users, the punishment is fixed.
But for the frequent attacking users, the punishment is
cumulative, and the period for cumulative punishment




ηiTpenalty, i = {1, 2, . . . } (18)
where ηi means the penalty factor.
On one hand, the extent of punishment is relevant to
the type of attack; the greater the threat is, the more seri-
ous the punishment is. On the premise of security, the
trust value can be directly reduced below the critical value
0. Because the trust mechanism we proposed is that the
users’ request is rejected while the trust value is below 0,
the other users can be protected from an attack.
On the other hand, the penalty scheme should follow a
habit of human society. The initial criminal punishment is
light, and the cumulative crime will be punished heavily.
It will not be forbidden to access the cognitive networks
forever, unless the attack users are destructive.
Moreover, the punishment level for the cluster heads is
much higher than the general cognitive user. It is a great
threat to the networks, when the cluster head launches an
attack, because the cluster head is highly reliable for FC.
The punishment of CHs will not be introduced for lack of
space, which involves the knowledge of the game theory.
5 Themechanism flow
When a new SUi starts a network accessing session, as
shown in Figure 2, it will query the networks in a round-
robin way and interact with the FC. The network will get
the access authentication and the authentication time and
query the historical trust value HistTri. If the trust value
is smaller than 0, then this user is forbidden to access the
network and wait for a time T before starting another
network accessing session. If it is the first time for this
user to access the network or the historical trust value
HistTri ≥ 0, then the FC would allow this user to access
the network. Then FC analyzes the value of cluster Ci and
allocate the user in the corresponding sub-cluster network
according to the value ofCi. The classifications include the
following three situations:
• When Ci has a history value, then the user can be
allocated to the corresponding sub-cluster network
instantly.
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Figure 2 The flow graph of scheme.
• When Ci has a history value, but the corresponding
sub-cluster network is overloading, the user should
access the other nearer sub-cluster according to the
geographic information.
• When Ci is empty, the user should access the nearest
sub-cluster according to the geographic information.
Within the permission of authorization, the cognitive
users in the cluster networks will share the trust values
with the cluster header.
Denote the set of clusters as S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sι}. The set
of cognitive user cluster that has resource Ri is SiRi , where
SiRi ⊂ S, Ri ∈ {R1,R2, . . . ,Rn}. The trust value information
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is in set SRi , containing direct trust value, indirect trust
value, historical trust value, and rewarding trust value.
5.1 Direct trust value
Assume the number of cognitive users in SiRi is m. When
a new cognitive user SUi wants to access the network, the
network firstly checks the direct interaction experience
between user SUi and the cluster header SUh as follows:
DirTrih = {DirTr1ih, DirTr2ih . . .DirTrnih} (19)
where n is the number of direct interactions.
5.2 Indirect trust value
Indirect trust value is got from the interactions between
the cognitive user SUi and other user SUj. There are at
mostm−2 (except of SUi and the cluster headerUh) users
that can interact with SUi. Then SUj produces the indirect
trust value sequence on SUi as follows:
IndTrij = {IndTri1, IndTri2, . . . , IndTri(m−1)} (20)
and
IndTrik = {IndTr1ik , IndTr2ik , . . . , IndTrlik} (21)
where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m − 2}, k = h, k = i, and l is the
number of interaction. If there is no interaction occurring
between user k and i, then IndTrik = 0.
5.3 History trust value
The cognitive users that once have accessed the network
but have left the network or their trust value license has
expired will record the trust value HistTi during the obser-
vation period among the user, cluster header, and FC,
which is a deterministic value but not a vector.
5.4 Rewarding trust value
The rewarding trust value of cognitive user at time t can
be obtained as Rewdi(t) according to formula (7).
The overall trust value can be obtained by substitut-
ing the four kinds of trust values into formula (12). While
cluster heads collect all cognitive users’ trust values, they
will report the generated values to FC. Then, the FC
will make a response according to the trust value, which
determines the network access permission of secondary
networks, and allocates the network resource and ser-
vices level by the value of λi. If there are criminal users,
the punishment threshold will be activated. Simultane-
ously, FC queries the network in the period of Tpolling
and punishes or rewards the users according to their trust
values. Finally, the FC updates the trust value matrix. In
Figure 3, it illustrates the demonstration process of trust
value interaction.
6 Complexity analysis
We proposed a dual-layer hierarchical architecture that
adds cluster heads as the trust agents and is different from
the general centralized management. Its main significance
is to reduce the amount of calculation and to protect the
security and reliability of the network environment.
6.1 The analysis of complexity from computational aspect
A centralized control scheme is presented in [16,17],
which needs setting a cognitive user as the target user
to compare with others, then FC adjudges whether the
user is abnormal by iteration. This scheme will bring FC






indirect information interactions have occurred in any of
the two or more users. In order to reduce these costs of
communication, a dual-layer hierarchical architecture was
proposed. Adding cluster heads between FC and SUs, the
trust value of comparison of SUs will be accomplished in
the cluster heads, and then the results will be reported
to FC by CHs. A plurality of cluster parallel comput-






improves the efficiency of information interaction among
the cognitive users.
6.2 The analysis of complexity from security
To control access complexity, the trust mechanism adds
the function of querying historical trust values. A white
list and trustable resource lists are defined, which can
assist FC to make a decision quickly. The historical trust
values, stored in the list, are the last value of trust evalu-
ation by the last accessed network, and this value can be
used as reference values of trust in the next access to the
networks. When the cognitive users apply for accessing to
the cognitive network, FC can query the history of user
trust and make rapid certification decision. Therefore, it
reduces the decision cycle.
7 Numerical and simulation results
In this section, we present the numerical results for the
proposed mechanism. The main parameters used for the
simulations are L = 10, K = 50, λ = {1.2, 1.5, 1.8},
Rf =1,500 ms and the simulations are conducted inMAT-
LAB R2012b environment. The main simulation objects
are variation rule of trust value, attenuation characteris-
tics of trust value, cluster head selection scheme, penalty
scheme, complexity analysis, and so on.
7.1 The general rule of trust value
The trust values consist of four kinds of trust values as
shown in formula (12). We present the variation rule
of honest users without attacking and misbehavior, in
Figure 4, in which Y -axis is the trust level that range
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Figure 3 The graph of trust interaction.
from −2 to 2 described in Subsection 2.3.2, and X-axis is
the interaction time. The normalized weight factors are
set as α = 0.85, β = 0.1, and γ = 0.05 produced a
sequence of direct trust value that increases gradually and
tends to be stable. Then, we substitute them into the for-
mula (12). For the initial historical trust value which is
equal to the existing value in the last time, the historical
trust value is set as 0 for simplicity. In case of complexity,
we do not consider the attenuation of trust value. From
Figure 4, we can see that the trust value of an honest user
is increasing with time that complies with the rule of the
network arising constantly and gradually closing to the
highest value of 2.
7.2 Attenuation
In Subsection 2.3.3, the definition and calculation formula
of attenuation function are described in the formulas (5)
and (11), respectively, which express that the trust value
tends to approach the minimum access threshold along
with the time development. We set the attenuation factor
σ = 0.1 and calculate the theoretical attenuation results
to get the expected real value through discretization pro-
cessing, as shown in Figure 5. The curves that describe
the general rule of attenuation that the trust values, even
if above or below 0, are regressing to the minimum access
threshold when time increases gradually.
7.3 The selection of cluster heads
We assume that 100 cognitive users are uniformly
random-distributed in the coverage area of FC and their
trust value is v ∈ (−2, 2). The selective threshold of the
cluster heads is ρr = 1.5, through calculation of algo-
rithm that we proposed in Subsection 3.1. As shown in
Figure 6, five cluster heads are selected from all the candi-
date cognitive users, which are marked by black pentacle.
The cluster heads’ sub-network coverage may be over-
lapped, and the trust value of the overlapped users will be
reported by the respective regnant CHs. In other words,
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Figure 4 The variation of an honest user’s trust values.
the trust value of a cognitive user will be reported to FC
by two or more than two CHs.
7.4 The penalty scheme
In Section 4, we have introduced three different types
of attacks and corresponding punishments. Figure 7
describes the changed curves of trust value under three
kinds of attack users. The trust values of users are equal
to each other at the beginning. Once the user launches an
attack, its trust value will change. The malicious users are
severely punished due to their destruction to the network.
Therefore, they are applicable to case 1, and their trust val-
ues decrease immediately to below−1. However, the trust
value gradually restored is aimed to re-access network
after a penalty period, which is in consonance with the
attenuation, and the recovery of trust value is a slow pro-
cess. For greedy users, which are applicable to case 2, pun-
ishment is to reduce the user-assigned resources through
regulating the trust value continually until the trust value
is reduced to less than 0 and is no longer allowed to access
the network. The recovery of greedy users is similar to the
malicious user. The unintentionally misbehaving users are
Figure 5 The attenuation trend graph.
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Figure 6 Cluster heads selection.
applicable to case 3, and their trust values will be reduced
less than 0 immediately once they have launched attack.
However, once the users are repaired, their trust value will
be restored to the former value.
Figure 8 describes that the recovery period of trust val-
ues under the three kinds of frequent attack. From the
graph, it shows that the reinstated trust value is slightly
lower than the value before punishment. Through this
penalty scheme to achieve constraint for attackers, the
users will be prohibited from accessing network if they
attacked consistently.
We also analyze the cumulative punishment scheme
for frequent attack in formula (18). From Figure 9,
it can be seen that the penalty time is increasing
along with the increasing number of attacks, accom-
panied by the trust value decreases gradually at the
same time. The cumulative punishment scheme mainly
imposes the tough penalties for users who are repeat-
ing offenders, which is more serious than the simple
punishment.
7.5 The successful transmission rate
Figure 10 simulates the changing rules of user’s suc-
cessful transmission rate in various attacks. We fully
consider penalty scheme, reward scheme from FC, and
the trust values attenuation of cognitive users, etc. We
assume that all the users’ initial successful transmis-
sion rates are 0.9. While there are no attackers, the
successful transmission rate of honest cognitive users
rises steadily with the interactional time increasing, and
gradually approach to 1 that conformed to the reward
scheme.
Reversely, the successful transmission rate is dropping
gradually when attacks occur, because FC dominates all
users and has the punitive power of misbehavior to reduce
the trust value in order to achieve the purpose of pro-
hibiting access to the cognitive networks. Among all the
attackers, the first class is UMUs. This type of attack
is easy to be detected and has no malicious subjective
attacks to the network. Therefore, FC has high tolerance
for this attack and the corresponding penalty level is lower,
so the curve of successful transmission rate appears to
be jumping with decreasing tendency. The second class
of attacker is GUs that easily destruct the network which
results in uneven distributions of resource. Therefore, FC
Figure 7 The change of trust value under the three kinds of attack.
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Figure 8 The period gram of punishment, the penalty accumulation factor η = 0 the recovery cycle diagram of trust value.
has heavier penalty involved in this type of attack. Due to
existing punishment period and reduced trust values, the
punishment effect is obvious and successful transmission
rate declines more greatly. The third class is MUs includes
SSDF and PUEA. The penalty is the most severe under
this type of attack, and the attackers will be punished
quickly once detected. Consequently, the curve graphs
of successful transmission rate are declining sharply. The
detection probability of PUEA is larger than SSDF under
centralized control [4]; thus, the PUEA can be detected
by FC easily and their transmission rate falls faster than
SSDF. Simulation results show that successful transmis-
sion rate of honest users are safeguarded effectively, under
the security management based on trust value mecha-
nism, whereas misbehaving users are shielded in part or
entirely, and also validate a better anti-attack ability than
the mechanism has.
7.6 Complexity analysis
Network burden is an essential performance evaluation
index to measure the proposed mechanism, and we define
it as the complexity of user management. The parameters
Figure 9 Contrast gram of punishment taking malicious users, for instance, the penalty accumulation factor η = 0 and η = 1.
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Figure 10 The successful transmission rate of different cognitive users.
of the network scale are the number of cognitive users
N = 100 and the number of cluster heads L =
{2 5 10}. Comparing with the single-stage centralized
control mechanism (SSCCM for short) in [17] and from
the analysis in Section 6, we get the relation of the network
burden versus the number of users as shown in Figure 11.
It can be seen that the network burden of our proposed
mechanism is relatively larger than SSCCMwhen the net-
work scale is small, because the proposed mechanism
has extra burden for added trust authentication function,
cluster heads selection function, penalty function, and
so on. However, with the increasing network scale, our
proposed mechanism shows a better performance than
SSCCM.
7.7 Simulation summary
The rationality and effectiveness of the mechanism pro-
posed in this paper through the above simulation have
been verified. The advantages of the mechanism com-
pared with others are mainly embodied as follows:
Figure 11 The relationship between the network load and user scale.
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• Trust model which accords with the basic
characteristic of human society
• According to the different types of attacks to
implement different punishment
• The FC + CH hierarchical architecture effectively
reduces the network management complexity.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the challenges in defend-
ing attacks in cognitive wireless networks. In addition, we
have found that a mass of studies focus on the attacker
detection, but precious few relevant literatures are studied
how to address those attackers while they were detected.
Therefore, we proposed a novel management mechanism
SMTD, which is based on trust and penalty, to deal with
security problems in CRNs. The proposed mechanism
has been verified that is has obvious superiority com-
pared with other mechanisms and it accords with require-
ments for deployment in the actual environment. The next
researches are to optimize the punishment mechanism
model and how to realize the more effective punishment,
optimize the cognitive radio network, and find the Nash
Equilibrium between cluster heads and network scale.
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